Abstract-We consider a network in which several service providers offer wireless access to their respective subscribed customers through potentially multihop routes. If providers cooperate by jointly deploying and pooling their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure (e.g., base stations) and agree to serve each others' customers, their aggregate payoffs, and individual shares, may substantially increase through opportunistic utilization of resources. The potential of such cooperation can, however, be realized only if each provider intelligently determines with whom it would cooperate, when it would cooperate, and how it would deploy and share its resources during such cooperation. Also, developing a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoffs is imperative for the stability of the coalitions. We model such cooperation using the theory of transferable payoff coalitional games. We show that the optimum cooperation strategy, which involves the acquisition, deployment, and allocation of the channels and base stations (to customers), can be computed as the solution of a concave or an integer optimization. We next show that the grand coalition is stable in many different settings, i.e., if all providers cooperate, there is always an operating point that maximizes the providers' aggregate payoff, while offering each a share that removes any incentive to split from the coalition. The optimal cooperation strategy and the stabilizing payoff shares can be obtained in polynomial time by respectively solving the primals and the duals of the above optimizations, using distributed computations and limited exchange of confidential information among the providers. Numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual providers' payoffs under the optimal cooperation strategy and several different payoff sharing rules.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
W E HAVE witnessed a significant growth in commercial wireless services in the past few years, and the trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Satisfaction of this increasing demand is contingent upon efficient utilization of the transmission resources, which are either underutilized (e.g., spectrum; utilization of licensed spectrum is at times only 15% [1] ) or costly (e.g., infrastructure). Cooperation among wireless providers, whereby different providers form a coalition and pool their resources, such as spectrum and infrastructure-like base stations (or access points) and relay nodes, and serve each other's customers, has the potential to substantially improve the utilization of the available resources. We now elucidate the benefits of such cooperation.
We first demonstrate how cooperation may substantially enhance throughput through efficient opportunistic utilization of resources and lower overall energy consumption of the customers through multihop relaying; both result in higher customer satisfaction and payoffs for the providers. Transmission qualities of available channels randomly fluctuate with time and space, owing to customer mobility and propagation conditions. Also, in secondary access networks, the providers may be secondary users who do not license channels, but communicate when the license holders (primary users) do not use the channels. Such access opportunities may only arise sporadically. Since all customers of all providers do not need to be served simultaneously, and the channels of different providers may not be unavailable or have poor qualities simultaneously, spectrum pooling can enhance throughput by mitigating service fluctuations resulting from occasional variations in channel qualities and availabilities and instantaneous traffic overloads. In multihop wireless networks (e.g., mesh networks), cooperation increases the number of relays (mesh points). This in turn increases the number of multihop routes to each customer, thereby decreasing the total power usage and increasing the total throughput of the customers. Also, the customers may be induced to serve as relays, perhaps, in lieu of service discounts. Then, the enhancement in throughput and energy consumption owing to cooperation magnifies as the coalitions have a larger set of customers.
Cooperation also reduces the costs incurred by the providers and thereby increases their net payoffs. A provider can acquire a channel by paying a fixed licensing cost or usage-based charges or a combination of the two. The first case arises when the providers are primary users who license the channels from government agencies, and the other options arise when they are secondary users who use the channels licensed by the primaries. When the providers do not cooperate, they may need to operate as secondary users and opt primarily for usage-based charges, as the volume of their individual traffic may not justify other options. Since cooperation allows the providers to pool the customers, the resulting higher aggregate traffic may allow them to license channels, share the licensing fees, and thereby reduce the individual costs. Next, deploying and maintaining base stations constitutes one of the major costs in expanding the networks. Cooperation may reduce the expansion costs by allowing the providers to deliver desired coverage and throughput guarantees while deploying fewer base stations. For example, for a provider whose customer base is concentrated in a particular region, traffic demand is low, but nonzero (owing to customer mobility) elsewhere. However, it must deploy base stations even in the regions of low demand so as to provide universal coverage (otherwise the customers would desert). If instead it cooperates with another provider whose demand is concentrated in a different region, both may satisfy coverage requirements by deploying base stations only in the regions where their individual demands are concentrated, and thereby reduce individual operational expenses.
B. Research Challenges and Contributions
Several research challenges must, however, be addressed before large-scale cooperation can be realized. First, commercial service providers are selfish entities who seek to maximize their individual payoffs. Therefore, they will cooperate only when cooperation increases their individual incomes. Even so, a provider may refuse to join a coalition if it perceives that its share of the aggregate payoff is not commensurate to the amount it invested and the wealth it generated. The former depends on the transmission rates in the channels it has acquired and the locations and the number of base stations it has deployed, while the latter depends on its customer base. Thus, developing a rational basis for determining the individual shares of the aggregate payoff is imperative. Note that the aggregate payoff and the individual shares depend on the providers' cooperation strategies. Specifically, each provider needs to decide which providers it would cooperate with, which channels it would use, the locations of its base stations, and when it should serve the customers of other providers.
We present a framework to determine the optimal decisions of the providers using tools from transferable payoff coalitional game theory [2] . The framework also provides a rational basis for sharing the aggregate payoff. The first network setup we consider is an access network where providers pool their spectrum, base stations, and customers (Section IV). We assume that the locations of base stations and the set of channels they have access to are determined a priori, but the providers decide how they would allocate the base stations and the channels of the coalition to the customers. We then obtain optimal decision rules for the providers and a strategy for sharing the resulting aggregate payoff as solutions of concave optimization problems. This sharing strategy ensures that it is optimal for all providers to cooperate. Specifically, if any subset of providers split from the grand coalition (the coalition of all providers), irrespective of how they cooperate and the way they share their aggregate payoff, the payoff of at least one provider in this subset decreases. In coalitional game terminology, such a sharing scheme is said to belong to the core of the game. This result is of interest in itself as many cooperative games have empty cores, and the games we consider do not satisfy some standard sufficiency conditions for nonemptiness of the core (e.g., convexity of the game).
In the subsequent sections, we extend the formulation and results. We first consider the cases where the providers also need to determine the locations of their base stations or the set of channels each base station has access to (Section V). The optimal cooperation strategy can now be obtained by solving an integer optimization with nonzero duality gap unlike in concave optimizations used before. We obtain the optimal decision rules and the payoff sharing mechanism using unimodularity arguments. Subsequently, we extend the results in Section IV to multihop wireless networks and cooperation among Internet service providers (Section VI). We investigate whether other profit sharing mechanisms-namely, the nucleolus and the Shapley value-stabilize the grand coalition (Section VII). We examine the impact of providers' cooperation on the customers and propose a framework for optimal (and selective) acceptance of service level agreements (SLAs) by the providers (Section VIII). We numerically evaluate and compare the providers' payoff increases resulting from cooperation under different sharing mechanisms and different payoff functions as a function of the number of customers and base stations (Section IX).
II. RELATED WORK
Interactions among different entities in wireless networks have primarily been investigated from the following extreme perspectives. In the first, each entity is assumed to select its actions so as to maximize its own incentive without coordinating with others, e.g., [3] . This scenario, which has been investigated using noncooperative game theory, in general suffers from inefficient utilization of resources [4] . The other perspective has been to assume that entities selflessly choose their actions so as to optimize a global utility function even when such actions may deteriorate individual incentives of some entities, e.g., [5] . We investigate interactions among providers assuming that each provider would be willing to cooperate and coordinate its actions with others when such cooperation enhances its individual incentives. We obtain optimal cooperation schemes using the framework of coalitional games. This choice of tools allows us to combine the desirable features of the above extreme perspectives.
Coalitional games have been used recently for modeling cooperation among peers in a peer-to-peer network [13] , among Internet service providers [14] , cooperation in the physical layer among nodes in a wireless network [6] , [7] , among single-antenna receivers and transmitters in an interference channel [11] , collaborative sensing by secondary users in cognitive radio networks [8] , rate allocation in multiple access channels (MACs) [9] , rate allocation among mobiles, and admission control in heterogeneous wireless access environments [10] (see [12] for a survey). Our problem formulation, solution techniques, and results significantly differ from the above owing to the difference in contexts-our focus is on cooperative resource allocation at the network and MAC layers and subsequent payoff sharing among wireless providers. To our knowledge, our work is the first to investigate cooperation among wireless providers.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Communication Model
Consider a network with a set of providers . Each provider deploys base stations (or access points), each of which has access to a certain set of channels (e.g., FDM carriers in GSM and Fig. 1 . Dashed (solid, resp.) base stations, channels, and customers belong to provider 1 (2, resp.). Thus, and . Provider 1 owns two base stations, each of which has access to one channel, and thus corresponds to one service unit each. Provider 2 owns one base station that has access to two channels, and thus corresponds to two service units. Thus, and .
OFDMA systems). 1 Each base station-channel pair is referred to as a service unit. Thus, a provider's resources are its service units. Let ( , resp.) be the set of service units (customers, resp.) of provider and for . Let and denote the set of service units and customers of providers in . Thus, and are the sets of all service units and all customers, respectively (Fig. 1) .
Assumption 3.1: The achievable rates of a customer-service unit pair do not depend on communications of other customers and service units.
Each customer or a service unit may be involved in at most one communication at a given time (time sharing). We assume, unless mentioned otherwise, that: 1) the locations of the base stations and the channels they have access to are predetermined; and 2) the service units and the customers communicate through single-hop links. Each customer negotiates a service level agreement (SLA) in the form of a minimum rate guarantee with its provider.
For ease of exposition, we consider only downlink communications in our model (the results easily extend to the case where communications involve both uplinks and downlinks). Let represent a network state (customer location, channel qualities resulting from fading and channel access of primary users 2 ), be the collection of all 's, and be the probability that the network state is . We assume that when customer is served by service unit receives at a rate a random variable that is a function of and is denoted as . We assume that is finite, since: 1) feasible service rates in any practical communication system belong to a finite set; and 2) we can partition the geographical region where the network is deployed in such a way that the service rates are identical in each partition.
B. Coalition Game Model
We now propose a coalitional game theory framework that models the interactions of the providers. A service unit can serve a customer only when both are associated with the same provider or with providers in a coalition. Consider a network state . Let be the fraction of time service unit serves customer . When the provider associated with customer is in coalition , the rate received by is . Note that does not depend on due to Assumption 3.1. When customers associated with provider receive rates gains a benefit (e.g., revenue from the customers) of , where is a concave function. Next, owing to the tariffs imposed by spectrum regulators or by the license holders of the channels, provider incurs a cost of , where is the total fraction of time service unit is used and is a convex function. 3 Then, the profit (or payoff) of a coalition is the sum of the 's for minus the sum of the 's for . We assume that the benefit and cost functions are decided a priori (based on spectrum regulation, customer charging policies, etc.) and do not investigate the optimal selections of these functions.
Providers in a coalition have to decide how to schedule service units to customers, i.e., select the variables 's, for each , based on the benefit and cost functions , and the service unit to customer rates 's so as to attain the maximum possible payoff subject to possible service level agreements.
C. How the Framework Relates To Existing Wireless Networks
We now illustrate via examples how our framework can be used to model specific communication systems. Consider elastic data transfers in the downlink of a CDMA cellular system (e.g., used for Internet access of cellular subscribers) [15, Ch. 5] with provider set . Owing to simplicity of physical-layer implementations, a base station always transmits at a predetermined fixed power . This happens even when no mobile associated with it requires downlink transmission [16] . Each base station has access to only one band, and thus the service units are same as the base stations. Customers in a cell are served on a time-sharing basis, i.e., a base station transmits to at most one customer at a given time. Also, at any given time, a customer receives transmissions from at most one base station. Then, represent the fractions of time customers are served 3 We say if the inequality is satisfied for each component. Then, a function is increasing if for any . Natural revenue and cost connotations would imply that are increasing and 0 at the origin-though our formulations and analytical results do not rely on these assumptions. Again, usually, , where is an increasing concave (either strict or linear) revenue function chosen by provider for customer . We therefore allow a provider to choose different revenue functions for different customers. The revenue functions are assumed to be concave since customers would pay in accordance with their satisfactions, which are usually concave functions of rates (increase sublinearly in practice).
by different base stations. When base station transmits to customer and the network realization is , the achievable rate from to is a function of the downlink signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), [15, Ch. 5] , where and where are the channel gains between customer-base station pairs, is the power spectral density of the additive noise, and is the spectrum bandwidth. 4 Thus, , and hence , is independent of which customers are being served by other base stations. Thus, Assumption 3.1 holds.
Next, consider downlink communications in a multicell OFDMA system [15, Ch. 6] . Different providers acquire nonoverlapping bands, and the bandwidth acquired by a provider is divided into several channels (sub-carriers in OFDM terminology). (For small-scale providers, some of these channels can be secondary access channels or spectrum white-spaces acquired from primary users.) Each provider partitions its set of subcarriers into reuse groups, assigning one such group of subcarriers to each base station in such a way to ensure that intercell interference to simultaneous transmissions in other base station subcarrier pairs is negligible. At any given time, a base station assigns a subcarrier to only one customer, but more than one subcarrier can be assigned to a customer (multiple allocation). Thus, the intracell interference is negligible as well. Also, each base station, in each state , assigns a fixed transmit power to each of its carriers. Thus, the rate that a customer gets from a service unit (which denotes a base station and subcarrier pair) to which it is assigned depends only on the channel gain from the corresponding base station-subcarrier pair to itself, channel usage of primary users as applicable, and not on the assignments of other customers and service units. Hence, Assumption 3.1 holds.
IV. RESOURCE POOLING GAME
A. Optimal Allocation of Customers to Service Units
The characteristic function for a coalition is the maximum aggregate payoff of providers in and is given by the following concave optimization problem: subject to: 1) ; 2) ; 3) ; 4) ; 5) ; 6) . Constraints 3) ensure that for all , the fraction of time customer is served is at most 1. Constraints 4) ensure that the fraction of time each service unit serves is at most 1. 5 Constraints 5) provide the minimum service guarantees. Incidentally, constraints 3) and 4) arise from the time-sharing model, 6 but for the multiple allocation model (see the last paragraph of Section III-C), only 4) suffice-all results presented below extend even in absence of 3).
Assumption 4.1: is feasible for each , i.e., each provider can support the minimum rates of its customers even when it does not cooperate with other providers.
Then, is feasible for each and provides the optimal service unit-customer allocations that attain the maximum aggregate payoff of the providers in a coalition .
Finally, we examine whether the above resource allocation framework captures the intricacies of existing wireless traffic. We focus on data as it is fast emerging as the predominant component of wireless traffic. Many emerging applications, such as streaming video, require a certain minimum rate, and the quality of service is critically sensitive to the service rate. Thus, minimum rate constraints are likely to be integral components of service agreements in the near future, and providers are likely to charge: a) fixed fees that are increasing functions of the minimum rates agreed upon; and b) additionally for service rates they can provide over and above the required minimum value. A customer may, however, be willing to pay additionally for rates only up to a certain maximum rate value determined by his QoS requirements. 7 The following simple pricing strategy captures the above features. If the average rate a customer of provider receives is , and he has negotiated a minimum rate guarantee of , then he pays , where is the maximum rate the customer needs (Fig. 2 with ). Owing to the minimum rate constraints 5) in , each customer's average rate is at least . Thus with captures the above pricing strategy. Note that is a concave function for each . Finally, constraints 5) in apply to the average service rates; more stringent QoS demands may require constraints on service rates in each , i.e., given certain desired minimum rates at each 5 When a base station has access to multiple channels with only one radio, constraint 4) must be modified to bound the sum of over customers and service units corresponding to the base station by 1. For example, if the base station has access to channels, the fractional associations to the corresponding service units, , satisfy the constraint . It can be shown that all the subsequent results extend to this scenario. 6 The system can be represented by a complete bipartite graph where the customers and the service units represent the nodes and there exists a link between every customer-service unit node pair. Under the time-sharing model, any customer-service unit assignment corresponds to a matching in the above graph. Note that for each comprise a feasible allocation of service units to customers if and only if there exists a corresponding collection of matchings and a collection of nonnegative real numbers such that: a)
, and b) if the service unit-customer allocation follows matching for fraction of time for each , then service unit transmits to customer for fraction of time for all . Constraints 3) and 4) provide the necessary and sufficient condition for feasibility of for each [17] . 7 For instance, for layered video streaming [18] , all customers need a minimum rate for an acceptable quality video, but they do not need more than the rate required to decode the finest layer. . The modified optimization continues to be a concave maximization with linear constraints, and all subsequent results apply. Alternatively, "soft" minimum rate guarantees may be ensured in each by choosing strict concave revenue functions. The higher the degree of concavity of the revenue functions (that is, the lower the second derivatives), a provider incurs higher additional revenue in any by enhancing the rate of a customer who is receiving a low rate at that as opposed to enhancing that of a customer who is receiving a high rate at that . Thus, providers are more likely to equalize the rates of all customers at each , and thereby ensure certain minimum rates to each customer at every .
B. Sharing Aggregate Payoffs
A rational basis for sharing the maximum aggregate payoff is imperative to motivate the providers to join the grand (or any other) coalition. We use a solution concept from coalitional games known as the core to provide such a basis.
Definition 4.1: For any real valued vector and any coalition , we let . Such a vector is said to be an imputation if and for all . The core of the coalitional game with transferable payoff is the set of all imputations for which for all . In other words (1) An imputation provides the payoff shares of providers in a grand coalition such that no provider's payoff is below what it earns in absence of cooperation. The core is a collection of imputations that provide stronger guarantees: No coalition has any incentive to split from the grand coalition if the providers share the aggregate payoff as per an imputation in the core. To see this, suppose a set of providers form a separate coalition and share their aggregate payoff as per . A provider , however, would agree to split from the grand coalition only if . Thus, , which contradicts the fact that . Therefore, every imputation in the core renders the grand coalition stable.
We now elucidate and using a simple example. is an imputation in the core. When 1, 2 cooperate, the benefit (revenue) earned from 1's (2's, resp.) customers is 0 ( , resp.), and therefore less (more, resp.) than its payoff under the above imputation. Provider 1's payoff is positive since its service unit fetches part of the coalition revenue by serving 2's customers. Also, this imputation increases each provider's payoff by as compared to that in absence of cooperation (i.e.,
). In several coalitional games, the core is empty, i.e., no allocation can stabilize the grand coalition [2, Example 260.3], and in general it is NP-hard to determine whether the core of a coalitional game is nonempty [19] . A sufficient condition for the core to be nonempty is the convexity of the coalitional game, i. , and is the value of the objective function of for the above feasible solution. Therefore, the optimal value of is a lower bound for , i.e., . Thus, any imputation in stabilizes the grand coalition. It also ensures that the payoffs of the providers are commensurate with the resource they invest and the wealth they generate. For instance, if there are no minimum rate requirements and the benefit and cost functions are linear, , and provider 's payoff equals the sum of the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints 3) and 4) for its customers and service units ( , respectively). Lagrange multiplier ( , resp.) is high only when service unit (customer , resp.) is fully utilized, i.e., serves customers (is served, resp.) all the time, and provides high transmission rates and costs less (pay more, resp.) per unit time (bandwidth, resp.). Thus, 's Lagrange multipliers, and hence 's payoff, is high when it invests more resource and/or generates more wealth.
C. Computation Complexity and Distributed Computation
Note that are concave optimizations with linear constraints, and ( , resp.) has variables and constraints ( variables, constraints resp.). 9 . The dual also satisfies the above conditions provided additionally: a) the minimum rate constraints do not exist; b)
for some and for all ; and c) the first and third derivatives of these functions are upper-bounded. For is a function of the bounds in b) and c), is the absolute value of the maximum of the above first derivatives, and are as for . The computation times can be large since , typically, is large. This may not, however, pose a major challenge as the computations are done offline using large workstations and at a slower timescale (only when the network state statistics change or the coalitions are assessed). Also, whenever customers do not have minimum rate constraints [see constraints 5)], we can solve both by solving separate convex optimizations, one for each -the number of variables and constraints for each such optimization depends only on . 11 This separability allowed us to solve the above optimizations for reasonably large systems using Monte Carlo simulations (Section IX). 12 Concave optimizations with linear constraints can be solved in distributed manner using the theory of subgradients, as described in [27] for example. The advantage of this distributed computation is that each provider needs to know only its benefit and cost functions (and not those of the others), the link rates only when either is its customer or is its service unit. The need for limited access to global information ensures confidentiality of operations.
For brevity, we describe the distributed computations only for -an imputation in the core may be similarly computed via solving . We consider the case that have bounded partial derivatives and the customers do not have minimum rate requirements. Therefore, owing to the separability described above, we focus on the optimization for only one . Based on message exchanges with other providers, each provider iteratively updates: a) the downlink allocations from its service units to all customers; b) the rates of its customers ; and c) the total time allocation for its service units and the iterations provably converge to the optimum (the superscript indicates the iteration index). At the end of each iteration, each provider communicates: a) the iterates for all its service units (i.e.,
; and b) indicators indicating the status of the satisfaction of the constraints 1) and 3) for its customers (i.e., ) to the providers whose service units can serve its customers (i.e., those with positive to its customers). These indicators are used by other providers in the updates for the next iterations.
We describe the indicators and the update process next. Let be 1 if for customer at the end of the th iteration the left-hand side (LHS) exceeds the right-hand side (RHS) of constraint 1), 1 if the RHS exceeds the LHS, and 0 otherwise. Next, is defined similarly for constraint 2) (for service unit ). Now, is 1 if for customer the LHS exceeds the RHS of constraint 3), and 0 otherwise. Next, is defined similarly for constraint 4) (for service unit ). We now describe the update for each provider , using constants that would be described later. In the th iteration, provider : a) for each of its customers , obtains by adding and ; b) for each of its service units , obtains by decrementing by ; and c) for each customer and its service unit (not necessarily its customer though) such that , obtains by adding and . The updates of the optimization variables depend on the derivatives of the objective functions and also on whether the constraints are satisfied-intuitively, the iterates successively move closer to the optimum value of the objective function subject to the constraints. Formally, similar to the proof of [27, Theorem 5] , it can be shown that for any: a) exceeding the maximum value of the partial derivatives of the functions, and b) such that converge to the optimum allocations [26] .
D. Insights From the Framework
Now, we discuss how this framework can provide useful insights about the relation between a provider's payoff share, the resources it contributes, and the wealth it generates. Among the demands and assets in possession of a provider, one could be more constrained than the others. For instance, a provider might have a lot of customers, but few service units. Then, increasing the number of service units could increase the payoff generated by the provider, while adding to the number of customers might not change it. An intuitive observation then is that the provider that offers more of the demand or asset that is sought most by the majority in the coalition is likely to receive a larger share of the aggregate payoff. The following example will further elucidate this.
Example
and to the three providers as compared to the case when they do not cooperate. Also, somewhat contrary to intuition, provider 1, who has the least number of service units, attains the highest payoff. This is because the other providers, i.e., 2, 3, have fewer customers than service units, and these excess service units are utilized only when 1 joins the coalition along with its customers. Thus, 1 is adding the most value to the coalition by bringing in the demand that is sought by others: Note that , but . Also, the providers' shares of the aggregate payoff are usually largely determined by parameters other than their decision variables, e.g., the number of customers, service units, etc.
In Example 4.3, if provider 2 can somehow expand its customer base, e.g., by extensive advertising, its share increases, although the aggregate payoff remains the same. Thus, a provider can accordingly decide how to upgrade its resources.
V. RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT GAMES
We now consider a service unit deployment game that allows the providers to maximize the aggregate payoffs and also enhance individual payoffs by deciding which bands to lease from spectrum regulators or primary users and also where to deploy base stations in addition to deciding their allocations to customers. Redefine to be the set of service units available to provider are assumed to be disjoint. A provider can use a service unit available to it once it "opens" it by paying a fixed fee subsequently pays usage based charge for using (the function in the previous sections), which depends only on the amount of usage and is 0 if is not used. Let if provider opens , and 0 otherwise. A provider need not open all service units available to it, and thus the 's constitute its decision variables (in addition to the 's). A service unit can then serve customer if: a) , and b) and are associated with the same provider or with different providers who are in a coalition.
We now describe how: a) spectrum acquisition game, and 2) base-station location game can be captured in the setting of a service-unit deployment game. In the former, providers decide the channels each base station has access to. Each available service unit corresponds to a base station-available channel pair, and thus if a provider decides to allow a base station access to a specific channel , it opens the corresponding service unit by paying the spectrum regulator (a government agency or a license holder) the fixed fee (membership charge), , and pays usage-based charges for using it subsequently. Depending on the spectrum pricing model, either the membership charge or the usage-based charge may be zero, or both may be positive. 13 In a base station deployment game, a provider decides the locations of its base stations. We initially assume that each base station has access to only one band, and thus the service units are the same as the base stations. The set of candidate locations of base stations of provider constitutes its set of available service units, and the band available to a candidate location is decided a priori (based on interference conditions). A provider can construct a base station at a candidate location by paying the fixed establishment (and maintenance) cost . Usually, it will not pay any usage-based costs subsequently, and the functions are 0.
A. Characteristic Function Formulation
We now formulate the characteristic functions of the serviceunit deployment game. We assume for all for all , and also that customers are static and the quality of channels do not vary with time, i.e., . For a coalition , the payoff is then obtained by solving the following optimization problem: subject to: 1) ; 2) ; 3) ; 4) . Constraints 1) ensure that the total fraction of time customer is being served is upper-bounded by 1. A service unit can serve at most one fraction of time if it is open, and cannot serve otherwise, by constraints 2). The following example illustrates how cooperation may change providers' decisions regarding the opening of service units. , where the former payoff is the result of opening just service unit 3, while the latter arises in the event of opening both 2, 3. If , opening both service units is optimal when not in coalition, while opening only 3 is optimal otherwise. Thus, a provider may need to open fewer service units while in coalition, which is beneficial for large opening fees.
B. Nonemptyness of the Core
We proceed to prove that the core of the coalitional game , with characteristic function given by , is nonempty. Note that the aggregate payoff of a coalition now is given by an integer (rather than concave) optimization problem. As a result, the strong duality used in Section IV does not hold in general. Our proof relies on unimodularity arguments instead and proceeds in two steps.
Step (i): Consider the coalitional game , where is the same set of providers and the characteristic function is given by the linear program (LP) . is the linear relaxation of , where the constraints are now replaced by . We show that the core of the coalitional game , is nonempty. Using , and , we construct the following LP as the dual of :
. Let constitute the set of optimal solutions of . Define: for some .
Theorem 5.1:
, and Proof: The proof is identical to that of Theorem 4.1.
Step (ii): Next, we prove that, for any coalition has an integral optimum solution, which therefore constitutes an optimum solution of . We use the fact that, the constraints of can be represented as a totally unimodular matrix. Definition 5.1: A matrix A is totally unimodular if every square submatrix of A has determinant either 0, 1 or 1. We have the following sufficient conditions for the matrix A to be totally unimodular [28] .
Theorem 5.2: Suppose can be partitioned into two disjoint sets and , with the following properties: 1) Every column of contains at most two nonzero entries.
2) Every entry in is 0, 1, or 1.
3) If two nonzero entries in a column of have the same sign, then the row of one is in , and the other in . 4) If two nonzero entries in a column of have opposite signs, then the rows of both are in or both in . Then, is totally unimodular.
Theorem 5.3 [29] : The linear program subject to has an optimal integral solution if a) is totally unimodular; and b) contains only integers. For any coalition satisfies the sufficiency conditions in the above theorem, and therefore has an integral optimum solution. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4: For any coalition . [30] in time, where the obtained solution and the optimal solution match in most significant digits. 14 Also, the linear programs , D can be solved by the providers in a distributed manner and without revealing their confidential information such as the revenue and costs to each other, using the subgradient technique as described in Section IV. Finally, the resulting imputation, which belongs to the core, distributes the aggregate grand-coalition payoff among providers in accordance with the Lagrange multipliers of , which, as explained in Section IV, are commensurate with the resource investments and wealth generated by the providers.
C. Generalizations
We discuss how we can relax our simplifying assumptions. First, when the customers' locations and channels' qualities are random, i.e., , then we can prove using an extended duality technique that the core is nonempty and obtain an imputation in the core in polynomial time under an additional assumption:
for each [26] . Similar results can be shown for a joint spectrum acquisition and base-station location game where providers have to decide both the locations of the base stations and the set of channels each base station has access to (allowing each base station access to multiple channels) [26] . This additional assumption does not cause any loss of generality for the network states in which there are several customers with identical transmission rates from the service units (such states arise frequently when the number of customers is large). In such cases, the aggregate payoff may be maximized if each service unit time-shares among the customers that have identical transmission conditions-thus, even the optimizations that do not impose this condition explicitly will choose small 's.
VI. COOPERATION IN MULTIHOP NETWORKS
Cooperation in multihop networks allows the cooperating providers to redirect their traffic through possibly better multihop routes. Consider a network in which customers can communicate with service units via potentially multihop routes, that is, via other customers that act as relays. If now a set of providers agrees to cooperate by pooling their service units and customers, not only do they benefit from sharing others' service units (as in single-hop networks), but they also have access to more relay nodes. This, in turn, can increase the capacity of the network, as well as its power efficiency, 14 Thus, is the number of accuracy digits of the generated solution. Often, the computation time results are stated in units of , e.g., per accuracy digit in the algorithm output. Fig. 3 . Dashed (solid, resp.) base stations, channels, customers, and links belong to provider 1 (2, resp.). Here, , and . Providers 1 and 2 want to send data to customers 6 and 1, respectively, through multihop routes. The thick dotted links are those resulting from providers' cooperation.
thereby enhancing the payoffs of the providers. 15 For instance in Fig. 3 , in absence of cooperation, provider 1 can send data to customer 6 only through , but when the providers cooperate, it can also send through . We formulate the interactions among the providers in a multihop network using a coalitional game model, prove that the core of this game is nonempty, obtain polynomial-time computable: a) optimal strategies that maximize the aggregate payoffs; and b) payoff shares for individual providers that render the grand coalition stable (i.e., an imputation in the core) and are also commensurate with the resource investment and wealth generated by the providers.
As in single-hop networks, providers determine the allocations of the service units. However, an interesting question is this: Who determines the communication routes-providers or customers who relay the traffic? When a customer relays others' packets, it essentially provides a service that enhances the providers' payoffs and consumes its time and energy, and must therefore be compensated via discounts from the providers. Such discounts must depend on how much traffic each customer relays and how much time and energy it invests in relaying. Thus, in its relaying role, a customer is like any other "resource" (like spectrum for example) whose utilization fetches benefits and also incurs costs. Thus, the providers determine the multihop routes so as to best utilize the customers' service potentials and to regulate the costs they incur. Note that a customer can regulate its participation in relaying through a maximum relaying agreement with its provider that limits the amount of time it can be used for relaying others' traffic.
We now describe how the resource pooling game formulated in Sections III and IV may be generalized to allow multihop transmissions. Consistent with the downlink communication assumption, we assume that service units transmit to customers (who are either sinks or relays), but do not receive from them. We assume that a pair of customers can communicate with each other (to relay packets) without interfering with the communications of other customer-customer or customer-service unit pairs (owing to appropriate channel allocations for example). Similar transmission models have extensively been assumed in related contexts, e.g., [5] . The wireless link to a customer from a service unit or another customer can transmit packets at a rate , a random variable that is a function of the network state . A customer and a service unit, or two customers, can communicate only when both are associated with the same provider or with different providers in the same coalition. For instance in Fig. 3 , the links -and -arise when the two providers cooperate.
The service rate of a customer is defined as the total rate at which traffic intended for reaches . Let be the maximum fraction of time customer spends as a relay. Let be the fraction of time customer receives the packets destined for customer from customer or service unit when the network state is for all and . The providers determine the routes through the choice of the allocations . Consider a coalition and a network state . When the provider associated with customer is in receives a service rate . Let . Then, provider gains a benefit (e.g., revenue from its customers) of . Next, customer relays the traffic for fraction of time, where . Let represent the power usage of customer when it transmits to (and thereby relays others' traffic to) customer . Then, a customer in a coalition , has a total power usage of in relaying packets. Let and . Then, provider incurs a cost of owing to the compensations (i.e., service discounts) required by its customers for spending time and energy in relaying packets.
( , resp.) are concave (convex, resp.) and are decided a priori, possibly through prior negotiations with the customers. The locations of service units and the set of channels they have access to are determined a priori. Thus, we do not consider fixed base-station deployment costs or channel licensing costs.
The aggregate payoff available to providers in a coalition is the difference between their benefits and costs. Therefore, in order to maximize their aggregate payoff, providers in a coalition must optimally decide the allocations , based on the network state, and benefit and cost functions, subject to the minimum rate and maximum relaying constraints. Let denote the maximum aggregate payoff achievable by a coalition . Then, is the maximum value of the objective function of the following concave optimization:
. Constraints 4) ensure that the set of 's satisfy the flow feasibility constraints, constraints 5) and 6) guarantee that they constitute a feasible allocation for 16 , and constraints 7) and 8) impose minimum rate and maximum relaying guarantees, respectively. As in Assumption 4.1, we assume that is feasible for each , and thus, is feasible for each . Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, one can formulate the dual problem of the concave maximization (which is always feasible) and subsequently define the set appropriately.
The same proof technique then shows that belongs to the core, which therefore is nonempty.
Finally, similar formulations may be used to model cooperation among Internet service providers (ISPs) in the same tier. Specifically, peer ISPs may form coalitions where the providers in the same coalition route traffic to the customers (i.e., end-users or the ISPs in lower tiers) through each other's routers (analogous to our service units). The characteristic function now represents the total profit of the ISPs in a coalition and can be obtained by solving a concave maximization with linear constraints, similar to -the differences in this optimization are that: a) there is only one as the link qualities will not vary randomly in wireline networks; b) cost functions are zero as the routers belong to the ISPs; c) constraints 5) and 6) on the fraction of time each service unit and relay is used must be replaced by link capacity constraints. The duality gap continues to be zero. Hence, it can be shown similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1 that the core is nonempty and an allocation in the core can be obtained in polynomial time.
VII. OTHER SOLUTION CONCEPTS: NUCLEOLUS AND SHAPLEY VALUE
We now examine whether other aggregate payoff sharing rules, namely the nucleolus and the Shapley value, stabilize the grand coalition (i.e., belong in the core). 16 At each , the system can be represented by a graph where the customers and the service units represent the nodes and there exists a link between any two nodes (only one of which can be a service unit) such that . Any customer-service unit and customer-customer assignment corresponds to a matching in the above graph. Note that comprise a feasible allocation of service units to customers if and only if there exists a corresponding collection of matchings and a collection of nonnegative real numbers such that: a) ; and b) if the allocations follow matching for fraction of time for each , then customer receives from customer or service unit for fraction of time for all . A sufficient condition for feasibility is that the fraction of time each service unit or customer communicates is below , where is a constant in and depends on the network topology. For bipartite networks, for instance, , which is also a necessary condition [17] . It has been shown that in general, is a sufficient but not a necessary condition [17] . Nevertheless, utilization would usually be less than so as to avoid inordinate queuing delays. Thus, constraints 5) and 6) provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for feasibility of for each and -the value is chosen based on delay constraints.
A. Nucleolus Definition 7.1:
The excess of a nonempty coalition under an imputation is . Let , i.e., is the maximum among the excesses of the nonempty and proper subsets of the grand coalition, is the second maximum, etc. The nucleolus is the imputation that lexicographically minimizes the excesses, i.e., has the minimum value of among all the imputations, subject to minimizing minimizes , and so on.
Recall that ( , resp.) are the maximum aggregate payoff (aggregate payoff under , resp.) of coalition . Thus, one can think of as a measure of dissatisfaction of under . Then, the nucleolus is the payoff share (of the aggregate grand coalition payoff) that equalizes the dissatisfactions of the coalitions as far as possible.
The nucleolus of any transferable payoff coalitional game is a singleton [2, p. 288] . Whenever the core of a coalitional game is nonempty, its nucleolus belongs to the core.
When there are only two providers, the excesses of the coalitions for an imputation are -these are the negatives of the payoff gains brought about by cooperation. Clearly, , and thus the sum of the two excesses is a constant. Also, since the nucleolus minimizes the maximum excess, it equalizes the two excesses and is the payoff vector . Thus, in Example 4.1, the nucleolus payoff allocations are , respectively. 17 The imputations obtained earlier by solving the dual of the aggregate payoff maximization problems need not equalize the payoff gains, but rather distributes the payoffs in accordance with the resource investments and the wealth generated by the providers (Section IX).
B. Shapley Value Definition 7.2:
For any , and such that , let . The Shapley value is the imputation for which (2) where is the set of all orderings of the set of players, and is the set of players preceding in ordering . In Example 4.1, , and the Shapley value is . Shapley value is the unique imputation that attains certain desirable game-theoretic properties like symmetry, dummy player allocation, and additivity [2, p. 292] . When there are only two providers, the Shapley value is identical to the nucleolus and therefore belongs in the core. However, in case of three or more providers, the Shapley value need not be in the core, and therefore need not stabilize the grand coalition:
Example 7.1: Let and be nonempty for each provider . Let 17 The aggregate payoff of the coalition is maximized by only serving 2's customers. But, if 1's customers leave,
, and , and the nucleolus is . Thus, although 1's customers do not receive any service from the coalition, and therefore do not generate any revenue, their mere presence enhances 1's payoff (from to ). Since the number of coalitions increases exponentially with increase in the number of providers, naive strategies for evaluating for a given imputation require exponential computation time. Thus, naive strategies for evaluating the nucleolus that minimizes the above among all imputations also require exponential computation time. Computation of the Shapley value through (2) also requires exponential time as the number of possible orderings of the providers increases exponentially with increase in the number of providers. On the other hand, the imputations obtained by solving the duals of the aggregate payoff maximization problems are polynomial-time computable and also stabilize the grand coalition.
VIII. IMPACT OF COOPERATION ON CUSTOMERS
Cooperation enhances providers' aggregate payoffs, which are increasing functions of the customers' service rates. Thus, intuitively, the rates of most of the customers increase when the providers cooperate. Cooperation may however decrease the rates of some of the customers, and therefore induce unfairness. In Example 4.1, when the providers do not cooperate, all customers may receive nonzero rates, but the customers of provider 1 receive no service when the providers cooperate.
The unfairness is, however, mitigated when the providers' benefit functions are strictly concave. For example, if the benefit function in Example 4.1 is logarithmic (instead of linear), i.e., , then it can be shown that each customer of provider 1 is served fraction of time (assuming , which for example happens if ) [26] . Note that when (since then as well), then each customer of provider 1 (and of provider 2 as well) is served approximately 50% of time irrespective of whether the providers cooperate. Thus, cooperation does not induce any unfairness in this case. 18 The benefit functions may be chosen during negotiations between providers and customers and may also be controlled by regulatory bodies (e.g., FCC in the U.S.).
Our coalitional game framework also allows the customers to mitigate this unfairness (even in presence of linear benefit functions) by imposing minimum rate constraints through SLAs (Example 4.1 had no SLAs), e.g., all the customers in Example 4.1 may ask for a minimum rate . Then, , and each customer receives the same rate irrespective of cooperation. However, then the core has the unique imputation of , which provides no payoff gain to any provider as compared to when they do not cooperate. The question then is whether provider 1 should accept the above SLA. More generally, should providers accept any SLA? The following example suggests that the providers ought to accept SLAs, but selectively. , and , and therefore, . If ( , resp.), then it is optimal for provider 1 to reject (accept, resp.) both SLAs. If , then it is optimal for provider 1 to accept only one of the SLAs.
We now introduce a framework that allows the providers in a coalition to jointly decide which SLAs to accept. Clearly, the optimal cooperation strategy of a coalition then involves selecting a set of SLAs that maximize the aggregate payoff-let be this maximum aggregate payoff. Let be a decision variable indicating whether customer 's SLA is accepted:
if so, and otherwise. Then, is given by the maximum value of the objective function of in Section IV, with constraints 3) and 5) being , respectively. Note that for any customer , the minimum rate constraint [modified constraint 5)] is nontrivial, only if . Also, for a customer with , for each and at each because of constraint 6) and modified constraint 3). These two conditions ensure that in any optimal solution of the above optimization problem, only customers with accepted SLAs are served. Thus, the solution of this integer optimization provides the optimum set of acceptable SLAs. Establishing the nonemptiness of the core of this coalitional game remains open.
IX. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATIONS
In the context of the resource pooling game (Section IV), we evaluate the benefits of cooperation and compare different payoff sharing schemes such as the dual-based payoff shares (Section IV) and the nucleolus (Section VII) for a range of benefit functions.
We first consider a logarithmic revenue (benefit) function and zero cost function for each provider . Thus, is strictly concave and assumes positive values except when is the zero vector, and in this case the revenue is 0. Note that logarithmic functions have been widely used as satisfaction functions of customers and therefore constitute good candidates for the revenues they pay (and hence for the benefits the providers incur). The cost functions are zero when the providers acquire the resources (spectrum, base stations) a priori by paying fixed (licensing or deployment) fees and do not incur subsequent usage-based costs. 19 Also, we assume that the customers do not have SLAs as is typically the case for elastic transfers from the Internet (e.g., file transfers). We allow the service unit-customer rates to be uniformly distributed over the set Kb/s, and to be independent across service unit-customer pairs . The characteristic functions for different coalitions and the dual-based imputation in the core can now be obtained by solving the concave optimization (Section IV). The nucleolus can subsequently be computed using Definition 7.1. We denote the payoff of a provider : a) in absence of cooperation as (i.e., ); b) in the grand coalition as (nucleolus) or (via solving dual optimization). Owing to large state spaces, we use Monte Carlo simulations in our evaluations.
We first consider three providers, , and , where ranges from 1 to 20 (Fig. 4) . The plots show that cooperation leads to substantial payoff improvements for all providers, and the payoff gains increase as the number of customers increase. As expected (from Definition 7.1), the nucleolus distributes the payoff gains more equitably than the dual-based profit share, which allocates payoff gains in increasing order of the number of customers (wealth generated), reserving the highest payoff gain for the provider with the highest number of customers. Nevertheless, the payoffs of each provider are similar under both payoff sharings and also to those under the Shapley value (see [26] ). The percentage gains in payoffs due to cooperation are quite significant (30%-40%) for each provider.
Henceforth, for simplicity, we focus on two providers. Recall that the Shapley value is the same as the nucleolus in this case. We investigate the impact of varying the: a) demand (number of customers), and b) asset (number of service units) of only one provider while keeping the other's demand and asset fixed. First, let and vary the number of customers of provider 2 (Fig. 5) . Next, we let , and vary the number of service units of provider 2 (Fig. 6 ). As the demand (or asset) of the second provider is increased, the payoff of the second provider increases under both the nucleolus and dual-based payoff sharing rules, but that of the first may either increase (Fig. 5) or decrease (Fig. 6) , depending on how its importance in the cooperation changes due to the increase in the demand (or asset) of the second. Mathematically, , and as the demand (asset) of the second increases, increase, but does not change. Thus, the difference may either increase or decrease. Nevertheless, the payoff of the first always exceeds that it attains without cooperation. Also, in both cases, the provider with the larger demand or asset obtains higher payoffs under both sharing rules. 19 Recall that the fixed service unit deployment and acquisition fees need to be considered explicitly only when the deployment and acquisition of service units constitute optimization decision variables as in the resource deployment game in Section V, and not when these are decided a priori as in the resource pooling game of Section IV. We now investigate how the choice of the revenue function affects providers' payoff gains. In particular, we consider the generalized -fair revenue function [31] : , where . Note that for each , and thus intuitively the "concavity" of the revenue function increases with increase in (the function is linear if ). We plot the providers' percentage payoff gains as a function of , for and and (Fig. 7) . Nucleolus and the dual-based sharing rules provide similar payoff gains. More importantly, the percentage payoff gains for both providers increase significantly with increase in -thus, the higher the concavity, the more beneficial cooperation is. This can be explained as follows. For small (i.e., nearly linear benefit functions), at any , the aggregate revenue is maximized by allocating each service unit to one customer. Next, given that the number of customers (10 or 20) significantly exceeds the number of service units (1) of each provider, usually (i.e., for most ) each provider's service unit has excellent transmission conditions to at least one of its own customers. Thus, cooperation cannot enhance the aggregate customers' rates, nor the providers' aggregate and hence individual payoffs. As increases, the aggregate payoff increases when more equitable rates are provided to the customers at each . When not in coalition, in order to roughly equalize the rates of the customers, each provider's service unit must therefore serve customers with poor transmission quality for considerable fractions of time. When the providers cooperate, usually most of the customers have high transmission rates from at least one service unit-thus, equitable rates can also be provided by allowing each service unit to time-share among the customers (not necessarily of the same provider) that have good transmission quality from it. Thus, equity is attained through good match between customers and service units and without compromising the overall customer rates and providers' revenues. Thus, cooperation substantially enhances aggregate, and therefore individual, payoffs.
Finally, we illustrate the benefits of cooperation and compare the dual-and nucleolus-based payoff shares in the presence of SLAs. We consider three providers each with three service units and 10 customers. Now, Kb/s (200 Kb/s, resp.) with probability 0.8 (0.2, resp.). Each provider has three premium and seven best-effort customers: The former have negotiated SLAs that guarantee a minimum average rate . We consider linear revenue functions where captures the higher payoff per Kb/s for the service guarantees to the premium customers. We choose and . The revenue is denoted as "usage-based revenue, " and the rest is the fixed fee associated with SLAs. Due to symmetry, providers receive equal payoffs under both dual-and nucleolus-based shares. As Fig. 8 reveals, cooperation enhances each provider's revenue: The increase is significant when the size of each coalition increases from 1 to 2, and somewhat less when the size increases to 3. For small , a provider does not need to compromise on the efficient usage of resources (i.e., it preferentially serves the customers with high transmission rates). Each provider's payoff increases linearly with in this region due to the increase of the fixed fees associated with . However, beyond a certain threshold, each provider needs to schedule a few lower rate links to the premium customers (instead of the higher rate links to the best effort customers) to satisfy the SLAs. This lowers the aggregate service rates, and each provider's payoff decreases linearly with increase in . Cooperation increases this threshold and also the aggregate rate of all the customers by allowing the scheduling of higher rate links more often.
Next, we consider an asymmetric scenario where each provider has 10 customers as before, but they respectively have premium customers; is varied from 1 to 7. All the premium customers demand a minimum guaranteed rate of 125 Kb/s. It turns out that a provider alone cannot guarantee 125 Kb/s to more than three customers. Similarly, any two providers can support at most eight premium customers together. Thus, is not feasible for , and Assumption 4.1 no longer holds. For , we define as the objective function of with three premium customers, for is the objective function of with five premium customers, and for is the objective function of with eight premium customers. It turns out that the dual and nucleolus payoff shares are in the core, and hence the core is nonempty. Fig. 9 plots the providers' payoffs as functions of the number of premium customers of the third provider under both allocations. The dual-based allocation equally divides the total usage-based payoffs among all providers and allocates the fixed fees of each provider's customers to the provider. Thus, the payoffs of providers 1, 2 do not change with increase in , but that of provider 3 increases linearly with increase in . The nucleolus, however, transfers a part of the fixed fees provider 3 earns to other providers-intuitively, such transfer is warranted as provider 3 cannot support all its premium customers by itself for . Thus, payoff shares of all providers change with increase in , and evidently, the nucleolus-based payoff gains are more equitable than the dual-based ones. In all the allocations, a provider with larger number of premium customers gets a larger payoff share, and each provider's payoff increases substantially due to cooperation.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We studied cooperation among providers in wireless networks. If providers cooperate, they can jointly decide how to deploy their service units, pool their service units, and allocate them to the joint pool of customers in an optimal fashion. We formulated the problem as a transferable utility coalitional game. We showed nonemptyness of cores in various scenarios (see Theorems 4.1, 5.5, etc.) implying that cooperation is not only globally optimal, but also makes each of the providers better off. Our proof technique is constructive and yields an optimal resource allocation and corresponding profit shares. Our numerical evaluations reveal that cooperation substantially enhances individual provider's payoffs.
We now outline some open problems. The computation time for an allocation in the core may be high since it depends polynomially on the number of possible channel state and mobile location realizations , which is large. Obtaining near-optimal solutions with low computation time remains open. Next, in practice, coalition formation can incur overheads, e.g., from increased computing requirements. Investigating the stability of the grand coalition considering the coalition formation overhead constitutes an open problem. Finally, we considered a system where the customer subscriptions and the providers' revenue functions have already been determined. Investigating cooperation among the providers when the customers dynamically decide their subscription based on the revenue functions and how providers can dynamically and optimally select the revenue functions so as to enhance their individual shares of the overall profit remain open.
